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The Innocence Trap

By CAITLIN GLASS & JULIAN GREEN. Full Text.

What makes a conviction wrongful? Developments in DNA science have led to a wave of exonerations over the past thirty years, revealing sources of error in the criminal legal process. Innocence organizations proliferated to represent people whose convictions could be overturned by newly discovered evidence. This is vital work for the individuals who are released and for the purpose of systemic change. At the same time, a focus on exonerations constructs a relatively narrow conception of wrongful convictions—one that is synonymous with factual innocence.

This Article argues that a broader conception of wrongful convictions may be revealed through co-ideation with people in prison who are engaged in efforts to contest criminal law. Taking one example as a case study, we focus on a coalition called We Are Joint Venture, Inc., which is comprised of incarcerated organizers whose convictions rest on imputed liability murder doctrines like accomplice/joint venture liability and felony murder. These organizers highlight procedural and substantive features of imputed liability murder doctrines that lead to convictions contradicting community expectations of accountability—something we call “the innocence trap.”

Drawing on the methods of movement law and Participatory Law Scholarship, this Article is coauthored by the director of We Are Joint Venture, Inc ., who is serving a life sentence for murder under the joint venture theory, and a law scholar who has written about imputed liability doctrines. Our analysis contributes to legal thought in three ways. First, it builds on scholarship questioning the legitimacy of imputed liability murder doctrines and offers new possibilities for legislative and judicial interventions. Second, we advance a conception of wrongful convictions that invites inquiry into the logic and merits of criminal law, transforming even entrenched doctrines into sites of contestation. Finally, this Article underscores the epistemic, democratic, and substantive benefits of engaging with legal thinkers whose insights about the law stem not from the academy but from experience, study, and struggle.